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This essay argues that rational people don’t have goals, and that rational AIs shouldn’t have goals. Human actions are rational not because we direct them at some final ‘goals,’ but because we align actions to practices [1] : networks of actions, action-dispositions, action-evaluation criteria, and action-resources that structure, clarify, develop, and promote themselves. If we want AIs that can genuinely support, collaborate with, or even comply with human agency, AI agents’ deliberations must share a “type signature” with the practices-based logic we use to reflect and act.…

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